giovedì 29 ottobre 2009

Edward Said: The Public Role of Writers and Intellectuals

The Public Role of Writers and Intellectuals
By Edward W. Said

This article appeared in the September 17, 2001 edition of The Nation.
September 11, 2002

In everyday usage in the languages and cultures with which I am familiar, a "writer" is a person who produces literature--that is, a novelist, poet, dramatist. I think it is generally true that in all cultures writers have a separate, perhaps even more honorific, place than do "intellectuals"; the aura of creativity and an almost sanctified capacity for originality (often vatic in scope and quality) accrues to writers as it doesn't at all to intellectuals, who with regard to literature belong to the slightly debased and parasitic class of "critics." Yet at the dawn of the twenty-first century the writer has taken on more and more of the intellectual's adversarial attributes in such activities as speaking the truth to power, being a witness to persecution and suffering, and supplying a dissenting voice in conflicts with authority. Signs of the amalgamation of one to the other would have to include the Salman Rushdie case in all its ramifications; the formation of numerous writers' parliaments and congresses devoted to such issues as intolerance, the dialogue of cultures, civil strife (as in Bosnia and Algeria), freedom of speech and censorship, truth and reconciliation (as in South Africa, Argentina, Ireland and elsewhere); and the special symbolic role of the writer as an intellectual testifying to a country's or region's experience, thereby giving that experience a public identity forever inscribed in the global discursive agenda.

The easiest way of demonstrating this is simply to list the names of some (but by no means all) recent Nobel Prize winners, then to allow each name to trigger in the mind an emblematized region, which in turn can be seen as a sort of platform or jumping-off point for that writer's subsequent activity as an intervention, in debates taking place very far from the world of literature. Thus Nadine Gordimer, Kenzaburo Oe, Derek Walcott, Wole Soyinka, Gabriel García Márquez, Octavio Paz, Elie Wiesel, Bertrand Russell, Günter Grass, Rigoberta Menchú, among several others.

Now it is also true, as Pascale Casanova has brilliantly shown in her synoptic book La République mondiale des lettres, that, fashioned over the past 150 years, there seems to be a global system of literature now in place, complete with its own order of literariness (littérarité), tempo, canon, internationalism and market values. The efficiency of the system is that it seems to have generated the types of writers that she discusses as belonging to such different categories as assimilated, dissident and translated figures--all of them both individualized and classified in what she shows is a highly efficient, globalized, quasi-market system. The drift of her argument is to show that this powerful and all-pervasive system can go even as far as stimulating a kind of independence from itself, as in cases like Joyce and Beckett, writers whose language and orthography do not submit to the laws either of state or of system.

Much as I admire it, however, the overall achievement of Casanova's book is nevertheless contradictory. She seems to be saying that literature as globalized system has a kind of integral autonomy to it that places it in large measure just beyond the gross realities of political institutions and discourse, a notion that has a certain theoretical plausibility to it when she puts it in the form of un espace littéraire internationale, with its own laws of interpretation, its own dialectic of individual work and ensemble, its own problematics of nationalism and national languages. But she doesn't go as far as Adorno in saying, as I would too, that one of the hallmarks of modernity is how, at a very deep level, the aesthetic and the socialneed to be kept in a state of irreconcilable tension. Nor does she spend enough time discussing the ways in which the literary, or the writer, is still implicated--indeed frequently mobilized for use--in the great post-cold war cultural contests of the world's altered political configurations.

Looked at from that perspective, for example, the debate about Salman Rushdie was never really about the literary attributes of The Satanic Verses but rather about whether there could be a literary treatment of a religious topic that did not also touch on religious passions in a very, indeed in an exacerbated, public way. I don't think that such a possibility existed, since from the very moment the fatwa was released to the world by Ayatollah Khomeini, the novel, its author and its readers were all deposited squarely inside an environment that allowed no room for anything but politicized intellectual debate about such socioreligious issues as blasphemy, secular dissent and extraterritorial threats of assassination. Even to assert that Rushdie's freedom of expression as a novelist could not be abridged--as many of us from the Islamic world did assert--was in fact to debate the issue of the literary freedom to write within a discourse that had already swallowed up and occupied (in the geographical sense) literature's apartness entirely.

In that wider setting, then, the basic distinction between writers and intellectuals need not be made. Insofar as they both act in the new public sphere dominated by globalization (and assumed to exist even by adherents of the Khomeini fatwa), their public role as writers and intellectuals can be discussed and analyzed together. Another way of putting it is to say that we should concentrate on what writers and intellectuals have in common as they intervene in the public sphere.

First we need to take note of the technical characteristics of intellectual intervention today. To get a dramatically vivid grasp of the speed to which communication has accelerated in the past decade, I'd like to contrast Jonathan Swift's awareness of effective public intervention in the early eighteenth century with ours. Swift was surely the most devastating pamphleteer of his time, and during his campaign against the Duke of Marlborough in 1711-12 was able to get 11,000 copies of his pamphlet The Conduct of the Allies onto the streets in two months. This brought the Duke down from his high eminence but nevertheless did not change Swift's pessimistic impression (dating back to A Tale of a Tub, 1704) that his writing was basically temporary, good only for the short time that it circulated. He had in mind, of course, the running quarrel between ancients and moderns, in which venerable writers like Homer and Horace had the advantage over modern figures like Dryden by virtue of their age and the authenticity of their views of great longevity, even permanence.

In the age of electronic media such considerations are mostly irrelevant, since anyone with a computer and decent Internet access is capable of reaching numbers of people quantum times more than Swift did, and can also look forward to the preservation of what is written beyond any conceivable measure. Our ideas today of discourse and archives must be radically modified and can no longer be defined as Foucault painstakingly tried to describe them a mere two decades ago. Even if one writes for a newspaper or journal, the chances of digital reproduction and (notionally at least) an unlimited time of preservation have wreaked havoc on the idea of an actual, as opposed to a virtual, audience. These things have certainly limited the powers that regimes have to censor or ban writing that is considered dangerous, although there are fairly crude means for stopping or curtailing the libertarian function of online print. Until only very recently Saudi Arabia and Syria, for example, successfully banned the Internet and even satellite television. Both countries now tolerate limited access to the Internet, although both have also installed sophisticated and, in the long run, prohibitively expensive interdictory processes to maintain their control.

As things stand, an article I might write in New York for a British paper has a good chance of reappearing on individual websites or via e-mail on screens in the United States, Japan, Pakistan, the Middle East and South Africa as well as Australia. Authors and publishers have very little control over what is reprinted and recirculated. I am constantly surprised (and don't know whether to be angry or flattered) when something that I wrote or said in one place turns up with scarcely a delay halfway around the world. For whom then does one write, if it is difficult to specify the audience with any sort of precision? Most people, I think, focus on the actual outlet that has commissioned the piece or on the putative readers we would like to address. The idea of an imagined community has suddenly acquired a very literal, if virtual, dimension. Certainly, as I experienced when I began ten years ago to write in an Arabic publication for an audience of Arabs, one attempts to create, shape, refer to a constituency. This is requisite now much more than during Swift's time, when he could quite naturally assume that the persona he called a Church of England man was in fact his real, very stable and quite small audience.

All of us should therefore operate today with some notion of very probably reaching much larger audiences than any we could conceive of even a decade ago, although the chances of retaining that audience are by the same token quite chancy. This is not simply a matter of optimism of the will: It is in the very nature of writing today. This makes it very difficult for writers to take common assumptions between them and their audiences for granted, or to assume that references and allusions are going to be understood immediately. But writing in this expanded new space strangely does have a further and unusually risky consequence: being encouraged to say things that are either completely opaque or completely transparent (and if one has any sense of intellectual and political vocation, it should of course be the latter rather than the former).

On one side, a half-dozen enormous multinationals presided over by a handful of men control most of the world's supply of images and news. On the other, there are the independent intellectuals who actually form an incipient community, physically separated from each other but connected variously to a great number of activist communities shunned by the main media but who have at their disposal other kinds of what Swift sarcastically called oratorical machines. Think of what an impressive range of opportunities is offered by the lecture platform, the pamphlet, radio, alternative journals, the interview form, the rally, church pulpit and the Internet, to name only a few. True, it is a considerable disadvantage to realize that one is unlikely to get asked onto the PBS NewsHour or ABC Nightline, or if one is in fact asked, that only an isolated fugitive minute will be offered. But then other occasions present themselves, not in the soundbite format but rather in more extended stretches of time.

So, rapidity is a double-edged weapon. There is the rapidity of the sloganeeringly reductive style that is the main feature of "expert" discourse--to-the-point, fast, formulaic, pragmatic in appearance--and there is the rapidity of response and expandable format that intellectuals and indeed most citizens can exploit in order to present fuller, more complete expressions of an alternative point of view. I am suggesting that by taking advantage of what is available in the form of numerous platforms (or stages-itinerant, another Swiftian term), an intellectual's alert and creative willingness to exploit them (that is, platforms that either aren't available to or are shunned by the television personality, expert or political candidate) creates the possibility of initiating wider discussion.

The emancipatory potential--and the threats to it--of this new situation mustn't be underestimated. Let me give a very powerful example of what I mean. There are about 4 million Palestinian refugees scattered all over the world, a significant number of whom live in large refugee camps in Lebanon (where the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacres took place), Jordan, Syria and in Gaza and the West Bank. In 1999 an enterprising group of young and educated refugees living in Dheisheh camp, near Bethlehem on the West Bank, established the Ibdaa Center, whose main feature was the Across Borders project; this was a revolutionary way, through computer terminals, of connecting refugees in most of the main camps, separated geographically and politically by impossibly difficult barriers, to one another. For the first time since their parents were dispersed in 1948, second-generation Palestinian refugees in Beirut or Amman could communicate with their counterparts inside Palestine. Some of what the participants in the project did was quite remarkable. Thus when Israeli closures were relaxed somewhat the Dheisheh residents went on visits to their former villages in Palestine, and then described their emotions and what they saw for the benefit of other refugees who had heard of but could not have access to these places. In a matter of weeks a remarkable solidarity emerged at a time when, it turned out, the so-called final-status negotiations between the PLO and Israel were beginning to take up the question of refugees and return, which along with the question of Jerusalem made up the intransigent core of the stalemated peace process. For some Palestinian refugees, therefore, their presence and political will was actualized for the first time, giving them a new status qualitatively different from the passive objecthood that had been their fate for half a century.

On August 26, 2000, all the computers in Dheisheh were destroyed in an act of political vandalism that left no one in doubt that refugees were meant to remain refugees, which is to say that they were not meant to disturb the status quo that had assumed their silence for so long. It wouldn't be hard to list the possible suspects, but it is hard to imagine that anyone will ever be named or apprehended. In any case, the Dheisheh camp-dwellers immediately set about trying to restore the Ibdaa Center, and seem to some degree to have succeeded. To answer the question "why" individuals and groups prefer writing and speaking to silence is equivalent to specifying what the intellectual and writer confront in the public sphere. The existence of individuals or groups seeking social justice and economic equality--and who understand, in Amartya Sen's formulation, that freedom must include the right to a whole range of choices affording cultural, political, intellectual and economic development--ipso facto will lead to a desire for articulation rather than silence. It almost goes without saying that for the American intellectual the responsibility is greater, the openings numerous, the challenge very difficult. The United States, after all, is the only global power; it intervenes nearly everywhere, and its resources for domination are very great, although far from infinite.

The intellectual's role generally is to uncover and elucidate the contest, to challenge and defeat both an imposed silence and the normalized quiet of unseen power, wherever and whenever possible. For there is a social and intellectual equivalence between this mass of overbearing collective interests and the discourse used to justify, disguise or mystify its workings while at the same time preventing objections or challenges to it. In this day, and almost universally, phrases such as "the free market," "privatization," "less government" and others like them have become the orthodoxy of globalization, its counterfeit universals. They are staples of the dominant discourse, designed to create consent and tacit approval. From that nexus emanate such ideological confections as "the West," the "clash of civilizations," "traditional values" and "identity" (perhaps the most overused phrases in the global lexicon today). All these are deployed not as they sometimes seem to be--as instigations for debate--but quite the opposite, to stifle, pre-empt and crush dissent whenever the false universals face resistance or questioning.

The main goal of this dominant discourse is to fashion the merciless logic of corporate profit-making and political power into a normal state of affairs. Behind the Punch and Judy show of energetic debate concerning the West and Islam, for example, all manner of antidemocratic, sanctimonious and alienating devices (the theory of the Great Satan or of the rogue state and terrorism) are in place as diversions from the social and economic disentitlements occurring in reality. In one place, Hashemi Rafsanjani exhorts the Iranian Parliament to greater degrees of Islamization as a defense against America; in the other, Bush, Blair and their feeble partners prepare their citizens for an indeterminate war against Islamic terrorism, rogue states and the rest. Realism and its close associate, pragmatism, are mobilized from their real philosophical context in the work of Peirce, Dewey and James, and put to forced labor in the boardroom where, as Gore Vidal has put it, the real decisions about government and presidential candidates are made. Much as one is for elections, it is also a bitter truth that elections do not automatically produce democracy or democratic results. Ask any Floridian.

The intellectual can offer instead a dispassionate account of how identity, tradition and the nation are constructed entities, most often in the insidious form of binary oppositions that are inevitably expressed as hostile attitudes to the Other. Pierre Bourdieu and his associates have very interestingly suggested that Clinton-Blair neoliberalism, which built on the conservative dismantling of the great social achievements (in health, education, labor, social security) of the welfare state during the Thatcher-Reagan period, has constructed a paradoxical doxa, a symbolic counterrevolution that includes the kind of national self-glorification I've just mentioned. This, Bourdieu says, is

conservative but presents itself as progressive; it seeks the restoration of the past order in some of its most archaic aspects (especially as regards economic relations), yet it passes off regressions, reversals, surrenders, as forward-looking reforms or revolutions leading to a whole new age of abundance and liberty (as with the language of the so-called new economy and the celebratory discourse around network firms and the internet).

As a reminder of the damage this reversal has already done, Bourdieu and his colleagues produced a collective work titled La misère du monde (translated in 1999 as The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society), whose aim was to compel the politicians' attention to what in French society the misleading optimism of the public rhetoric had hidden. This kind of book therefore plays a sort of negative intellectual role, whose aim is, to quote Bourdieu again, "to produce and disseminate instruments of defense against symbolic domination which increasingly relies on the authority of science"--or on expertise or appeals to national unity, pride, history and tradition--to bludgeon people into submission. Obviously India and Brazil are different from Britain and the United States; but the often striking disparities in cultures and economies shouldn't obscure the even more startling similarities that can be seen in some of the techniques, and very often the aim, of deprivation and repression that compel people to follow along meekly. I should also add that one needn't always present an abstruse and detailed theory of justice to go to war intellectually against injustice, since there is now a well-stocked international storehouse of conventions, protocols, resolutions and charters for national authorities to comply with, if they are so inclined. And in the same context I would have thought it almost moronic to take an ultrapostmodern position (like Richard Rorty while shadowboxing with some vague thing he refers to contemptuously as "the academic Left") and say--when confronting ethnic cleansing, or genocide as it is occurring today in Iraq, or any of the evils of torture, censorship, famine, ignorance (most of them constructed by humans, not by acts of God)--that human rights are "cultural things," so that when they are violated they do not really have the status accorded them by such crude foundationalists as myself, for whom they are as real as anything else we can encounter.

All intellectuals carry around some working understanding or sketch of the global system (in large measure thanks to world and regional historians like Immanuel Wallerstein, Anouar Abdel-Malek, J.M. Blaut, Janet Abu-Lughod, Peter Gran, Ali Mazrui, William McNeill); but it is during the direct encounters with it in one or another specific geography or configuration that the contests are waged (as in Seattle and Genoa) and perhaps even winnable. There is an admirable chronicle of the kind of thing I mean in the various essays of Bruce Robbins's Feeling Global: Internationalism in Distress (1999), Timothy Brennan's At Home in the World: Cosmopolitanism Now (1997) and Neil Lazarus's Nationalism and Cultural Practice in the Postcolonial World (1999), books whose self-consciously territorial and highly interwoven textures are in fact an adumbration of the critical (and combative) intellectual's sense of the world we live in today, taken as episodes or even fragments of a broader picture, which their work and that of others is in the process of compiling. What they suggest is a map of experiences that would have been indiscernible, perhaps invisible, two decades ago, but that in the aftermath of the classical empires, the end of the cold war, the crumbling of the socialist and nonaligned blocs, the emergent dialectics between North and South in the era of globalization, cannot be excluded either from cultural study or from the somewhat ethereal precincts of the humanistic disciplines.

I've mentioned a few names not just to indicate how significant I think their contributions have been but also to use them in order to leapfrog directly into some concrete areas of collective concern, where, to quote Bourdieu for the last time, there is the possibility of "collective invention." He observes that

the whole edifice of critical thought is thus in need of reconstruction. This work of reconstruction cannot be done, as some thought in the past, by a single great intellectual, a master-thinker endowed only with the resources of his singular thought, or by the authorized spokesperson for a group or an institution presumed to speak in the name of those without voice, union, party, and so on. This is where the collective intellectual [Bourdieu's name for individuals the sum of whose research and participation on common subjects constitutes a sort of ad hoc collective] can play its irreplaceable role, by helping to create the social conditions for the collective production of realist utopias.

My reading of this is to stress the absence of any master plan or blueprint or grand theory for what intellectuals can do, and the absence now of any utopian teleology toward which human history can be described as moving. Therefore, one invents--in the literal use of the Latin word inventio, employed by rhetoricians to stress finding again or reassembling from past performances, as opposed to the romantic use of invention as something you create from scratch--goals abductively, that is, hypothesizes a better situation from the known historical and social facts.

So in effect this enables intellectual performances on many fronts, in many places, many styles, that keep in play both the sense of opposition and the sense of engaged participation. Hence, film, photography and even music, along with all the arts of writing, can be aspects of this activity. Part of what we do as intellectuals is not only to define the situation but also to discern the possibilities for active intervention, whether we then perform them ourselves or acknowledge them in others who have either gone before or are already at work, the intellectual as lookout. Provincialism of the old kind--e.g., I am a literary specialist whose field is early-seventeenth-century England--rules itself out and, quite frankly, seems uninteresting and needlessly neutered. The assumption has to be that even though one can't do or know everything, it must always be possible to discern the elements of a struggle or tension or problem near at hand that can be elucidated dialectically, and also to sense that other people have a similar stake and work in a common project.

I have found a brilliantly inspiring parallel for what I mean in Adam Phillips's recent book Darwin's Worms, in which Darwin's lifelong attention to the lowly earthworm revealed its capacity for expressing nature's variability and design without necessarily seeing the whole of either one or the other, thereby in his work on earthworms replacing "a creation myth with a secular maintenance myth." Is there some nontrivial way of generalizing about where and in what form such struggles are taking place now? I shall limit myself to saying a little about only three, each of which is profoundly amenable to intellectual intervention and elaboration.

The first is to protect against and forestall the disappearance of the past, which in the rapidity of change, the reformulation of tradition and the construction of simplified bowdlerizations of history is at the very heart of the contest described by Benjamin Barber (though rather too sweepingly) as "Jihad versus McWorld." The intellectual's role is first to present alternative narratives and other perspectives on history than those provided by the combatants on behalf of official memory and national identity--who tend to work in terms of falsified unities, the manipulation of demonized or distorted representations of undesirable and/or excluded populations, and the propagation of heroic anthems sung in order to sweep all before them. At least since Nietzsche, the writing of history and the accumulations of memory have been regarded in many ways as one of the essential foundations of power, guiding its strategies and charting its progress. Look, for example, at the appalling exploitation of past suffering described in their accounts of the uses of the Holocaust by Tom Segev, Peter Novick and Norman Finkelstein or, just to stay within the area of historical restitution and reparation, the invidious disfiguring, dismembering and disremembering of significant historical experiences that do not have powerful enough lobbies in the present and therefore merit dismissal or belittlement. The need now is for deintoxicated, sober histories that make evident the multiplicity and complexity of history without allowing one to conclude that it moves forward impersonally according only to laws determined either by the divine or by the powerful.

Second is to construct fields of coexistence rather than fields of battle as the outcome of intellectual labor. There are great lessons to be learned from decolonization; first, that, noble as its liberatory aims were, it did not often enough prevent the emergence of repressive nationalist replacements for colonial regimes; second, that the process itself was almost immediately captured by the cold war, despite the nonaligned movement's rhetorical efforts; and thirdly, that it has been miniaturized and even trivialized by a small academic industry that has simply turned it into an ambiguous contest among ambivalent opponents.

Third, in the various contests over justice and human rights that so many of us feel we have joined, there needs to be a component to our engagement that stresses the need for the redistribution of resources and that advocates the theoretical imperative against the huge accumulations of power and capital that so distort human life. Peace cannot exist without equality: This is an intellectual value desperately in need of reiteration, demonstration and reinforcement. The seduction of the word itself--peace--is that it is surrounded by, indeed drenched in, the blandishments of approval, uncontroversial eulogizing, sentimental endorsement. The international media (as has been the case recently with the sanctioned wars in Iraq and Kosovo) uncritically amplify, ornament, unquestioningly transmit all this to vast audiences for whom peace and war are spectacles for delectation and immediate consumption. It takes a good deal more courage, work and knowledge to dissolve words like "war" and "peace" into their elements, recovering what has been left out of peace processes that have been determined by the powerful, and then placing that missing actuality back in the center of things, than it does to write prescriptive articles for "liberals," à la Michael Ignatieff, that urge more destruction and death for distant civilians. The intellectual can be perhaps a kind of countermemory, putting forth its own counterdiscourse that will not allow conscience to look away or fall asleep. The best corrective is, as Dr. Johnson said, to imagine the person whom you are discussing--in this case the person on whom the bombs will fall--reading you in your presence.

Still, just as history is never over or complete, it is also the case that some dialectical oppositions are not reconcilable, not transcendable, not really capable of being folded into a sort of higher, undoubtedly more noble, synthesis. The example closest to home for me is the struggle over Palestine, which, I have always believed, cannot really be simply resolved by a technical and ultimately janitorial rearrangement of geography allowing dispossessed Palestinians the right (such as it is) to live in about 20 percent of their land, which would be encircled by and totally dependent on Israel. Nor, on the other hand, would it be morally acceptable to demand that Israelis should retreat from the whole of former Palestine, now Israel, becoming refugees like Palestinians all over again. No matter how I have searched for a resolution to this impasse, I cannot find one, for this is not a facile case of right versus right. It cannot be right ever to deprive an entire people of their land and heritage or to stifle and slaughter them, as Israel has been doing for the thirty-four years of its occupation. But the Jews too are what I have called a community of suffering, and brought with them a heritage of great tragedy. Yet unlike Zeev Sternhell, I cannot agree that the conquest of Palestine was a necessary conquest--the notion offends the sense of real Palestinian pain, in its own way also tragic.

Overlapping yet irreconcilable experiences demand from the intellectual the courage to say what is before us, in almost exactly the way Adorno, throughout his work on music, insisted that modern music can never be reconciled with the society that produced it; but in its intensely and often despairingly crafted form and content, music can act as a silent witness to the inhumanity all around. Any assimilation of individual musical work to its social setting is, says Adorno, false. I conclude with the thought that the intellectual's provisional home is the domain of an exigent, resistant, intransigent art into which, alas, one can neither retreat nor search for solutions. But only in that precarious exilic realm can one first truly grasp the difficulty of what cannot be grasped, and then go forth to try anyway.


About Edward W. Said

Edward W. Said, the University Professor of English and Comparative Literature at Columbia University, was for many years The Nation's classical music critic as well as a contributing writer. His writing also regularly appears in London's Guardian, Le Monde Diplomatique and the Arab-language daily al-Hayat, printed in every Arab capital in the world.

http://www.thenation.com/doc/20010917/essay

Edward Said: Articoli su The Nation

Articoli pubblicati su The Nation

http://www.thenation.com/directory/bios/edward_w_said

giovedì 22 ottobre 2009

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Articoli di Edward Said

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Propaganda and war

by Edward Said

Never have the media been so influential in determining the course of war as during the Al-Aqsa Intifada, which, as far as the Western media are concerned, has essentially become a battle over images and ideas. Israel has already poured hundreds of millions of dollars into what in Hebrew is called hasbara, or information for the outside world (hence, propaganda). This has included an entire range of efforts: lunches and free trips for influential journalists; seminars for Jewish university students who over a week in a secluded country estate can be primed to "defend" Israel on the campus; bombarding congressmen and -women with invitations and visits; pamphlets and, most important, money for election campaigns; directing (or, as the case requires, harassing) photographers and writers of the current Intifada into producing certain images and not others; lecture and concert tours by prominent Israelis; training commentators to make frequent references to the Holocaust and Israel's predicament today; many advertisements in the newspapers attacking Arabs and praising Israel; and on and on. Because so many powerful people in the media and publishing business are strong supporters of Israel, the task is made vastly easier.

Although these are only a few of the devices used to pursue the aims of every modern government, whether democratic or not, since the 1930s and '40s -- to produce consent and approval on the part of the consumer of news -- no country and no lobby more than Israel's has used them in the US so effectively and for so long.

Orwell called this kind of misinformation newspeak or doublethink: the intention to cover criminal actions, especially killing people unjustly, with a veneer of justification and reason. In Israel's case, which has always had the intention to silence or make Palestinians invisible as it robbed them of their land, this has been in effect a suppression of the truth, or a large part of it, as well as a massive falsification of history. What for the past few months Israel has successfully wanted to prove to the world is that it is an innocent victim of Palestinian violence and terror, and that Arabs and Muslims have no other reason to be in conflict with Israel except for an irreducibly irrational hatred of Jews. Nothing more or less. And what has made this campaign so effective is a long-standing sense of Western guilt for anti-Semitism. What could be more efficient than to displace that guilt onto another people, the Arabs, and thereby feel not only justified but positively assuaged that something good has been done for a much-maligned and harmed people? To defend Israel at all costs -- even though it is in military occupation of Palestinian land, has a powerful military, and has been killing and wounding Palestinians in a ratio of four or five to one -- is the goal of propaganda. That, plus going on with what it does, but seeming to be a victim just the same.

Without any doubt, however, the extraordinary success of this unparalleled and immoral effort has been in large part due not only to the campaign's carefully planned and executed detail, but to the fact that the Arab side has been practically non-existent. When our historians look back to the first 50 years of Israel's existence, an enormous historical responsibility shall rest damningly on the shoulders of the Arab leaders who have criminally -- yes, criminally -- allowed this to go on without even the most meagre and half-hearted response. Instead, each of them has fought each of the others, or has relied on the hopelessly self-serving theory that by trying to ingratiate themselves with the American government (even becoming clients of the US) they would assure themselves of longevity in power, regardless of whether Arab interests were being served or not. So deeply ingrained has this notion become that even the Palestinian leadership has subscribed to it, with the result that as the Intifada rolls on, the average American hasn't the slightest inkling that there is a narrative of Palestinian suffering and dispossession at least as old as Israel itself. Meanwhile Arab leaders come running to Washington begging for American protection without even understanding that three generations of Americans have been brought up on Israeli propaganda to believe that Arabs are lying terrorists and that it is wrong to do business with them, let alone protect them.

Since 1948, Arab leaders have never bothered to confront Israeli propaganda in the US. All the immense amounts of Arab money invested in military spending (first on Soviet, then Western arms) have come to nought because Arab efforts have been neither protected by information nor explained by patient, systematic organising. The result is that literally hundred of thousands of lost Arab lives have gone for nothing, nothing at all. The citizens of the world's only superpower have been led to believe that everything Arabs do and are is wasteful, violent, fanatical and anti-Semitic. Israel is "our" only ally. And so $92 billion in aid since 1967 have gone unquestioningly from the US taxpayer to the Jewish state. As I said earlier, a total absence of planning and thought vis-à-vis the US political and cultural arena is hugely (but not exclusively) to blame for the astounding amount of Arab land and lives lost to Israel (subsidised by the US) since 1948, a major political crime which I hope the Arab leaders one day answer for.

I recall that during the siege of Beirut in 1982, a large non-governmental group of very successful Palestinian businessmen and prominent intellectuals gathered in London to establish an endowment to help Palestinians on all levels. With the PLO trapped in Beirut and incapable of doing much, it was felt that a mobilisation of this sort might help us to help ourselves. I also recall that as the funds were quickly gathered, a decision was made after much discussion that fully half the money would go for information in the West. It was felt that since -- as usual -- Palestinians were being oppressed by Israel with scarcely a voice lifted in the West to support the victims, it was imperative that money should be spent for advertisements, media time, tours and the like in order to make it more difficult to kill and further oppress Palestinians without complaint or awareness. This was especially important, we felt, in America, where taxpayers' money was being spent to subsidise Israel's illegal wars, settlements, and conquests. For about two years, this policy was followed; then, for reasons I have never fully understood, efforts to help the Palestinians in the US were abruptly terminated. When I asked why, I was told by a Palestinian gentleman who had made a fortune in the Gulf that "throwing money away" in America was a waste. The philanthropy now continues exclusively for the occupied territories and Lebanon, where this association does much good, but very little in comparison with the projects funded by the European Union and numerous American foundations.

Some weeks ago the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), by far the largest and most effective Arab-American organisation in the United States, commissioned a public opinion poll on current American perspectives on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. A very wide and deep sample of the population was polled, with quite startling, not to say disheartening results. Israelis are still believed to be a pioneering democratic people, even though no Israeli leader did very well in the poll. Seventy-three per cent of the American people approve of the idea of a Palestinian state, a very surprising result. The interpretation of that statistic is that when you ask an educated American who watches television and reads elite newspapers whether s/he identifies with the Palestinian struggle for independence and freedom, the answer is mostly yes. But if the same person is asked what his idea is about Palestinians, the answer is almost always negative -- violence and terrorism. Images of the Palestinians seem to be that they are uncompromising, aggressive, and "alien," that is, not like "us." Even when asked about the stone-throwing young people, whom we believe are Davids fighting against Goliath, most Americans see aggression rather than heroism. Americans still blame the Palestinians for obstructing the peace process, Camp David most particularly. Suicide bombing is viewed as "inhuman" and is condemned universally.

What Americans think of Israelis is not a great deal better, but there is a much greater identification with them as people. The most disturbing thing is that hardly any of the questioned Americans knew anything at all about the Palestinian story, nothing about 1948, nothing at all about Israel's illegal 34-year military occupation. The main narrative model that dominates American thinking still seems to be Leon Uris's 1950 novel Exodus. Just as alarming is the fact that the most negative things in the poll were what Americans thought and said about Yasser Arafat, his uniform (seen as needlessly "militant"), his speech, his presence.

Overall, then, the conclusion is that Palestinians are viewed neither in terms of a story that is theirs, nor in terms of a human image with which people can easily identify. So successful has Israeli propaganda been that it would seem that Palestinians really have few, if any positive connotations. They are almost completely dehumanised.

Fifty years of unopposed Israeli propaganda in America have brought us to the point where, because we do not resist or contest these terrible misrepresentations in any significant way with images and messages of our own, we are losing thousands of lives and acres of land without troubling anyone's conscience. The correspondent of the Independent, Phil Reeves, wrote passionately on 27 August that Palestinians are dying or being crushed by Israel and the world looks on silently.

It is therefore up to Arabs and Palestinians everywhere to break the silence, in a rational, organised and effective way, not by shooting off guns or by wailing or complaining. God knows we have reason to do all of the above, but cold logic is necessary now. In the American mind, analogies with South Africa's liberation struggle or with the horrible fate of the Native Americans most emphatically do not occur. We must make those analogies above all by humanising ourselves and thus reversing the cynical, ugly process whereby American columnists like Charles Krauthammer and George Will audaciously call for more killing and bombing of Palestinians, a suggestion they would not dare do for any other people. Why should we passively accept the fate of flies or mosquitoes, to be killed wantonly with American backing any time war criminal Sharon decides to wipe out a few more of us?

To that end I was pleased to learn from ADC President Ziad Asali that his organisation is about to embark on an unprecedented public information campaign in the mass media to redress the balance and present the Palestinians as human beings -- can you believe the irony of such a necessity? -- as women who are teachers and doctors as well as mothers, men who work in the field and are nuclear engineers, as people who have had years and years of military occupation and are still fighting back. (Incidentally, one astounding result of the poll is that less than three or four per cent of the sample had any idea that there was an Israeli occupation in the first place. So even the main fact of Palestinian existence has been obscured by Israeli propaganda). This effort has never before been made in the US: there have been 50 years of silence, which is about to be broken.

Even though it is modest, the announced ADC campaign is also a major step forward. Consider that the Arab world seems to be in a state of moral and political paralysis, its leaders encumbered by their ties both to Israel and, more important, to the US, their people kept in a state of anxiety and repression. As they and their brave Lebanese comrades did in 1982 when 19,000 were killed by Israeli military power, Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank are dying not only because Israel has the power to do so with impunity, but because for the first time in modern history, the active alliance between propaganda in the West and military force worked out by Israel and its supporters, has enabled the sustained collective punishment of Palestinians with American tax dollars, $5 billion of which go to Israel annually. Media representations of Palestinians show them with neither history nor humanity, as aggressive rock-throwing people of violence, and have made it possible for the dim-witted but politically astute George Bush to blame the Palestinians for violence. This new ADC campaign sets out to restore their history and humanity, to show them (as they have always been) as people "like us," fighting for the right to live in freedom, to raise their children, to die in peace. Once even the glimmerings of this story penetrate the American consciousness, the truth will, I hope, begin to dissipate the vast cloud of evil propaganda with which Israel has covered reality. Since it is clear that the media campaign can only go so far, then the hope is that Arab Americans will feel empowered enough to enter the political battle in the US to try to break, modify, or fray the link that binds US policy so tightly to Israel. And then, we can hope again.

Source:

by courtesy & © 2001 Al-Ahram Weekly & Edward Said

http://www.mediamonitors.net/edward37.html

domenica 18 ottobre 2009

Covering Islam

Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World
by Edward W. Said (Author)

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Covering-Islam-Media-Experts-Determine/dp/009959501X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1255872527&sr=8-1

sabato 17 ottobre 2009

Lavori in corso

http://esaid.altervista.org

lunedì 12 ottobre 2009

Alcuni siti

http://www.ibtauris.com/?TAG=&CID=

http://www.arabmedia.com/

http://www.al-bab.com/media/

http://www.arabmediawatch.com/amw/

http://www.memri.org/

Orientalism in the Media

How Media Struggle with Representing Cultures

© David Hamilton
Aug 9, 2007

The contemporary interpretation of Islam by the West seems to be ignorant of the complexity of this religion. Due to the short nature of news reports, it is easy for one to draw connections between Islam and oil, anti-American sentiment, and a host of other alarming things. A balanced portrayal of modern Islam is difficult to find in conventional media sources, and furthermore, if it was presented, it is likely that audiences would reject what they read, see or hear because of their preconceived notions of this foreign culture. Edward Said makes these arguments and more in Covering Islam, and shows how we orientalize foreign cultures(basically how we recreate what they are in our perceptions of them).

Said’s writing finds its way to communication studies, sociology and political economy syllabi and more because his concepts about the nature of global existence are making their way to the forefront of the social sciences. Covering Islam is in a series of books beginning with the seminal, Orientalism. The orientialism thesis is defined by Charlene Elliott of Carleton University as: “the ethnocentric and stereotypic means of viewing, describing, restructuring, and ultimately dominating Muslim lands in Africa and Asia.” One has to go no further than a local “ethnic” restaurant where there are clear stereotypes being played upon. A great example is chicken balls in Chinese restaurants. Westerners associate this dish as culturally Chinese but it is only traditional in Western Chinese restaurants and would seem very foreign if found in China. The fetishism of the so-called primitive and mysterious East exhibits itself in the West but it seems more and more that the “modern progress” of the West (that contributes so much to the degradation of the environment and social welfare) seems justified by the exclusively bad news about the middle-east generated in Western newsrooms.

Said essentially applies his thesis of orientalism to the situation of Islam. Said makes the argument that because Westerners have little contact with Islam, they tend to orientalize, or create a simplified and flawed understanding of its postulates that is more stylized or stereotyped than it ought to be. Journalists sent to the Middle East may be well equipped as observers but they must actually know the specifics of Islam to report upon it fairly. The context of events in the Muslim world has to be recognized. In telling a story, he argues, one must relate events in a way that the reader can understand it in terms of his/her society. If the meta-narrative of Islamic society is different than that of the West, this has to be taken into account. He illustrates that western journalists often do not understand the events of which they report by making the observation that most journalists do not even speak the local language form where they are reporting. This misunderstanding of what Islam entails, he argues, is not without its repercussions on the rift between East and West.

Because this book was written in 1981, Said writes about the hostage crisis in Iran two years prior to demonstrate the problems in the communication relations between the Muslim world and the West. He writes that reporters and the public found it hard to conceive of this other world – Walter Cronkite would pronounce Arab names seemingly dozens of times without success and viewers were under the impression that Shi’ite meant being “anti-American.” Said warns readers to be sceptical about reporting especially about a culture with which the Western world is generally unfamiliar. It is not an elitist stance on Said’s part but an observation that in the media rich environment that characterizes the end of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st, the human consciousness must generalize to make sense of a world that is ever more temporally and spatially compressed. Said concludes that there may be a change in the preponderance of predominantly negative news about the Islamic world because new generations of Westerners are less tied to the prejudices tied to conquest and domination of other cultures, and there is greater interest in learning about a different culture as an equal to one’s own rather than a “less-evolved” version of one’s own.

Said makes some excellent arguments about how the real Islam is more covered-up in its media interpretation than covered. He draws upon some very sophisticated ideas about how the imagination of locality is changing in the face of global communication networks.

Said goes beyond describing how the news could better be reported to discuss how the West has a sociological condition where there is a collective misinterpretation of Islam in the form of orientalization. As for the discontinuation of this trend, he offers some solutions but on the whole he is rather sceptical that people will forget their prejudices and it is easy to understand his pessimism. Covering Islam is a fascinating book that produces a grim logic for the ubiquitous prejudice in the West against the Islamic world.

The copyright of the article Orientalism in the Media in Philosophy is owned by David Hamilton. Permission to republish Orientalism in the Media in print or online must be granted by the author in writing.

http://philosophy.suite101.com/article.cfm/orientalism_in_the_media

martedì 6 ottobre 2009

Repairing American public diplomacy

Issue 7, Winter 2009

By William A. Rugh
State Department official Alberto Fernandez speaks on al-Jazeera

State Department official Alberto Fernandez speaks on al-Jazeera

It is widely believed among academics who study the subject, and among former practitioners, that public diplomacy has not achieved its full potential,[1] and we are hopeful that the Obama Administration will now solve some of its problems. This essay focuses on the most important challenges, which in many ways concern broadcasting to the Arab world.

Public diplomacy is of course not a panacea. America’s foreign policy decisions such as the Iraq war, or its policies at home such as the Patriot Act and Guantanamo detentions, have been strongly criticized abroad, undermining our international reputation and respect. Public diplomacy by itself cannot eliminate all criticism of our policies. It can only help to mitigate objections by explaining the U.S. government’s reasons for these policies, and by reminding foreign audiences of the aspects of America they still admire, in its society, culture and political system.

It is also true that the election of Barack Obama, which has generated a generally positive reaction around the world, will not by itself burnish America’s tarnished image abroad. His new policies may help, but misunderstandings of the United States will continue, out of ignorance or deliberate distortion. Public diplomacy programs can help present an accurate picture of America to foreign audiences, a task more important than ever in this age of 24/7 information proliferation.

What are the systemic problems hindering U.S. public diplomacy and how can the Obama Administration fix them?
Engaging with Arabic broadcasting

The worldwide proliferation of satellite television over the past decade provided an opportunity that the Bush administration missed, at least at first. Although al-Jazeera started in 1996 and quickly became the most popular Arabic news channel, Washington officials ignored it until after 9/11 when it broadcast statements by Osama bin Laden that were picked up by American commercial networks. The U.S. blamed the messenger and tried to get al-Jazeera to change by putting pressure on the station’s sponsor, the Qatari government.

Secretary of State Colin Powell complained to Qatar’s ruler, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, in October 2001 that the station was helping bin Laden by broadcasting his messages uncritically, but Sheikh Hamad deflected the complaint, saying it was misdirected because al-Jazeera was a private station.[2] Powell again complained to Qatar about al-Jazeera in April 2004, after the invasion of Iraq, saying that it was inciting Arab audiences to violence against American troops, which undermined U.S.-Qatari relations. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld also accused Al-Jazeera of "vicious, inaccurate and inexcusable reporting," and other officials echoed these charges.[3] Moreover, American officials imposed an unannounced boycott on al-Jazeera, preventing senior officials from participating in its programs.

This ineffective policy of trying to fight al-Jazeera was reversed later by Karen Hughes when she became Undersecretary of State in 2005. She realized that the boycott was harming American public diplomacy efforts more than helping them, and voices explaining and defending American policy were not being heard, so she encouraged officials to engage proactively with Arab media, and they did so.[4] She also established “media hubs” in Dubai and London staffed with public diplomacy professionals who jousted with Arab media full time. As the situation in Iraq deteriorated, for example, and critics all over the world and especially in the Arab countries blamed the United States for the lack of security, lack of services and generally chaotic conditions there, Karen Hughes herself and other senior officials participated in talk shows on Arab media in an effort to explain the American point of view. When the Israeli-Hizbullah conflict broke out in the summer of 2006, and criticism of Washington’s posture became intense, they again worked hard to engage in a discussion of American policy.

Working-level public diplomacy professionals continued to participate in discussions in Arabic and English with Arab media. Alberto Fernandez, a fluent Arabic speaker responsible for public diplomacy in the Near East Bureau at the State Department, was particularly active, speaking by phone usually several times each day with Arab broadcasting outlets, making the American case in a sophisticated and persuasive way. The return to engagement with Arabic media was a significant improvement in our public diplomacy effort that took place on Karen Hughes’ watch, although it has fallen off somewhat since she left her position in 2007, and her successor James Glassman focused more on the Internet. For example during the 2009 Gaza crisis, when criticism of the United States again increased, outreach to Arab television did not increase significantly.

Such outreach has been effective and should be sustained. There are encouraging indications that Barack Obama understands this. In his first week as President, he gave an exclusive interview to al-Arabiya Television, one of the leading regional Arab TV channels, in which he spoke directly to Arabs and Muslims in a way that was sensitive to their concerns. Prominent Arab commentators welcomed Obama’s choice of an Arab TV channel for one of his first interviews.[5]
BBG Arabic broadcasting

The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), which is responsible for all of the U.S. Government’s international broadcasting, has also made several missteps since 9/11 that have seriously harmed American public diplomacy. The Congress in 1999 abolished the U.S. Information Agency that then controlled all government civilian broadcasting, and turned it over to the nine-member bipartisan BBG. The intent was to isolate it from political influence, but in practice, the BBG has been an irresponsible steward of America’s broadcasting assets. It has turned out to be so independent that its members have taken decisions on their own that have caused consternation and protest among many people who believe the quality and effectiveness of programming has declined.[6] What has the BBG done?

In March 2002, the BBG cancelled the Voice of America’s Arabic Service that had been operating successfully since World War II, and substituted “Radio Sawa,” that broadcast mostly popular music for young listeners. The VOA Arabic Service had provided a broad spectrum of news, current affairs, features and other programs intended to appeal not only to youth but to all age groups including influential adults. When it was cancelled in 2002 it was reportedly reaching more than three million Arab adults on medium wave and short wave, including nearly half a million Saudis.[7] The move towards youth-oriented programming came at the expense of reaching decision makers and politically influential adults. Critics of Radio Sawa said it abandoned these listeners, undermining the public diplomacy impact of Arabic broadcasting.[8]

Then in February 2004, the BBG established a new Arabic language television channel, al-Hurra, intended to compete with al-Jazeera and other Arabic news channels. The BBG argued that al-Hurra would provide accurate information and truthful commentary in an environment that they claimed was both hostile to the U.S. and insufficiently “free.” But this project turned out to be a disappointment because of its poor programming and poll data showing that it failed to attract a significant audience. Moreover, its basic rationale was thrown into doubt when viewers who watched it found that it was less willing to tackle controversial subjects than al-Jazeera and other satellite TV channels. Independent observers have concluded that al-Hurra has failed.[9] A study by the University of Southern California in 2008, for example, found al-Hurra’s journalism was weak, lacked relevance to the audience, and was perceived to be biased propaganda.[10]

In the past, U.S. Government broadcasting faced the fundamental question of how to balance policy advocacy with good journalism. Effective public diplomacy should always be truthful to be credible, as Edward R. Murrow famously argued, but as a government-sponsored instrument it also has an obligation to help disseminate and explain U.S. policies. The VOA managed successfully to combine those two goals. The VOA Charter said: “As an official radio, VOA will present the policies of the United States Government clearly and persuasively.” But it added: “VOA will also present responsible discussion and opinion of these policies.” And it stressed the requirement of journalistic objectivity, saying VOA must be “a consistently reliable an authoritative source of news” that is “accurate, objective and comprehensive.” It said VOA must “represent America, not any single segment of American society. It will therefore present a balanced and comprehensive projection of American thought and institutions.”[11] The VOA repeatedly demonstrated that it could balance policy advocacy with good journalism. For example it covered the Vietnam War including the My Lai massacre in 1969 and then Watergate, telling the story honestly, but while also advocating U.S. policy.[12]

Radio Sawa and al Hurra have struggled unsuccessfully to fuse information and advocacy broadcasting.[13] Al-Hurra at first veered too far in the advocacy direction, and then when a new director tried to expand its journalistic freedom in 2007, he was fired for giving too much air time to Hassan Nasrallah.[14] The new stations have not found the proper balance that VOA had developed over a period of more than six decades.

Moreover, the BBG compounded the problem by deciding to pay for these new Arabic stations and stepped-up broadcasting to Iran by shifting money in the budget from more successful broadcasts to other parts of the world, rather than by asking Congress for new funding. This decision was taken in the context of the prevailing atmosphere in Washington in which senior officials of the Bush administration were focused so intently on Bush’s Global War on Terror and the Iraq and Afghanistan military conflicts, that other parts of the world appeared secondary.

The BBG seems to have followed this lead, and was willing to make major cuts in broadcasting to other parts of the world. Each year since 2002, the BBG has proposed cuts in language services for non-Middle East programming, affecting more than a dozen services. For example, it cut the Russian service in 2008 just twelve days before Russia invaded Georgia, and it eliminated Hindi, which alone had 8 million listeners. The BBG has also reduced worldwide English from a 24/7 service to fourteen hours per day, and even proposed eliminating it altogether. Critics were especially shocked that the BBG would even consider canceling English, since it is our native language, spoken worldwide, and used by Russia, France and other countries in their broadcasting. Observers said the BBG was making a big mistake to reduce non-Middle East broadcasting rather than asking Congress for more money.[15]

The BBG was created to be independent but it has become a small fiefdom beholden to a few narrow interests and in practice unaccountable because few outside the Board have paid attention to it. Congressional staffers say publicly that the system is broken.[16] For example, Radio Sawa and al Hurra were the brainchild of Norman Pattiz, a wealthy American radio broadcasting executive who was appointed to the Board by President Clinton and who after 9/11 single-handedly persuaded the Board to create them. Few members of Congress paid much attention to the project, and none of them had Arabic language skills to be able to evaluate it independently of what Pattiz told them.

The BBG system should be reformed, at least with a clear mandate and the addition of independent review boards. Radio Sawa and al-Hurra should be basically reformed. Congress has invested more than half a billion dollars in them so far and we deserve to have effective public diplomacy instruments for that kind of money.
The military-civilian imbalance

Since 9/11, the U.S. military for the first time has dramatically expanded its effort to communicate with foreign audiences. But this has created new problems.

It is new that the Pentagon now has important information programs for foreign audiences. In the past, between World War II and the end of the 20th century, civilian agencies of government were solely responsible for communicating with foreign publics. Department of Defense (DOD) information programs were almost entirely confined to American audiences, and intended to make the case for support and funding. Pentagon officials worked closely with Hollywood to help film makers present the U.S. military in a positive light. To cite only one example among many, the 1968 film The Green Berets starring John Wayne was filmed for 107 days at Fort Benning, and DOD loaned the producer airplanes, helicopters, troops and technical advisors. The government received only $18,623.64 for this support, which may have cost more than a million dollars.[17]

The Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS) was always intended exclusively for American military personnel stationed abroad. Occasionally, for example in 1990 when American troops were stationed in Saudi Arabia in preparation for the Desert Storm war, there was a substantial “shadow audience” of Saudi listeners to AFRTS programs, but the programs were not intended for them. The Pentagon’s only communication program directed at foreign audiences were clandestine psychological operations (“psyops”) aimed specifically at an enemy in wartime to support short term military objectives, such as programs targeted at Iraqi troops in Desert Storm to persuade them to surrender.

But recently DOD has dramatically expanded media operations directed at foreign audiences, primarily as a result of the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Immediately after the U.S. military destroyed the Iraqi army, Pentagon officials established the first post-Saddam television station and newspaper in order to help disseminate American official views to the Iraqi people. They then dominated the Coalition Provisional Authority which passed Iraqi media laws and then enforced them, shutting down Iraqi newspapers that the U.S. Government regarded as hostile to the occupation.[18] Pentagon officials in Iraq disseminated information daily explaining military successes, describing development and humanitarian assistance, and correcting errors in the Arab press.[19]

DOD information programs directed at Arab audiences continued in Iraq even when the United States turned sovereignty over to the Iraqis in June 2004. In 2005 it was revealed that the Pentagon had hired a private contractor, the Lincoln Group, to pay Iraqi editors clandestinely to run positive stories about the US occupation. DOD officials said this was necessary in time of war.[20] Civilian State Department public diplomacy officials, however, regarded this as contrary to best practices and harmful to their efforts. Story placement should not involve payment, and should not be clandestine.

The Pentagon was able to expand into information activities because it has huge budgets that are fungible and sufficient personnel. The Defense Department’s central role is war-fighting, but the Pentagon has gone way beyond that and taken up information programs directed broadly at foreign populations, for which it is not trained or equipped. Information programs directed at civilians were not only unusual for DOD, they were directed at fighting the Global War on Terror, a much narrower mandate than that of traditional public diplomacy. Because the Bush administration has declared a “war” on terrorism that is worldwide, and that there are wars going on in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is sometimes assumed that information programs should be taken over by the Pentagon. Certainly the Defense Department does have a proper role in conducting psyops operations against identified enemies. But this “mission creep,” justified by some in DOD as necessary in wartime, has gotten way out of hand. Both of President Bush’s Secretaries of Defense, Rumsfeld and Gates, have recognized that. They both publicly expressed concern that the Pentagon has taken over too much of the information effort that ought to be done by civilian agencies.[21] The primary responsibility for public diplomacy media operations should be restored to the State Department.
The neglected advisory function

A major role of public diplomacy is providing advice to policy makers on foreign opinion and the probable reaction of foreign publics to proposed courses of action. As a result of the Bay of Pigs fiasco of 1961, U.S. Information Agency (USIA) Director Edward R. Murrow told President Kennedy that he needed from then on to be “in on the take offs as well as the crash landings,” so Murrow was then included in policy discussions. But it has been more typical for policy makers to ignore advice on foreign public opinion. President George W. Bush in particular seemed uninterested in foreign opinion, and his administration made little use of public diplomacy professionals as monitors and analysts of it.

The Obama Administration should recognize that public diplomacy professionals and other diplomats working at embassies around the globe work every day at analyzing local public opinion, and they could provide very useful advice if the Washington leadership asked for it. When President Obama spoke to al-Arabiya TV on January 26, he said he had instructed his new Middle East envoy George Mitchell to “start by listening, because all too often the United States starts by dictating.”[22] That is a good sign.
Leadership vacuum

Leadership of American public diplomacy was unfortunately fragmented by the 1999 Congressional legislation that abolished the U.S. Information Agency (USIA). For five decades, 1953-99, the USIA Director had budget and personnel authority over all public diplomacy professionals in Washington and abroad. With the 1999 change, the Undersecretary of State was only the nominal successor to the USIA director but that position controlled only a tiny staff and had essentially no budget or personnel authority over the public diplomacy professionals scattered around the Department or at embassies abroad.

The Bush Administration showed little interest in or understanding of public diplomacy. When George W. Bush became president, he left this Undersecretary position vacant, only filling it after 9/11, when he suddenly became aware that foreign relations needed to be dealt with. But then he appointed to that position Charlotte Beers, whose only experience was in advertising and public relations.[23] She had no prior experience at all in public diplomacy, diplomacy, government or foreign affairs. Secretary Powell said he appointed Beers because she had persuaded him to buy Uncle Ben’s Rice. Powell failed to understand that public diplomacy is much more complicated than public relations or domestic commercial marketing of a product.

After 9/11, public diplomacy professionals at embassies all over the world were discussing foreign policy issues every day with their contacts. But Charlotte Beers thought that it was not her responsibility to deal at all with foreign policy.[24] She believed instead that her task was to talk to foreign audiences only about American society and values. She tried several new projects designed to “brand” America, including an expensive “shared values” media campaign and a new Arabic magazine called “Hi,” both of which were judged to be failures and were soon discontinued. She became frustrated with a lack of measurable success and resigned in early March 2003 after less than 17 months in the position.

After a hiatus she was followed by Margaret Tutwiler, who had been Department spokesperson and ambassador to Morocco. Tutwiler disappointed public diplomacy professionals when she told Congressional committees that she did not need additional funding. She stayed for only eight months and then abruptly resigned also.

The third Undersecretary was Karen Hughes, who had been a Texas television reporter and a close advisor to President Bush. Hughes made some modest improvements in public diplomacy, expanding the exchange program and starting some valuable new educational efforts. As noted above, she encouraged engagement with Arab media. She also initiated some useful media projects, such as the Rapid Reaction Unit that monitored foreign media and provided guidance on it, and the Digital Outreach Team that engaged with foreign bloggers.[25] But she stayed only two years (September 2005 – October 2007), and her efforts to deal with DOD and the BBG did not succeed. James Glassman, another media person, became Bush’s last Undersecretary in June 2008. He tried to use the web in new ways, but continued a narrow focus on fighting terrorism, rather than supporting broader objectives.[26] And since the Bush administration ended in January 2009, Glassman stayed in the job only six months. None of Bush’s four Undersecretaries achieved anything like the stature of Edward R. Murrow (1961-64) who is remembered as the USIA director who understood public diplomacy best.
The State bureaucracy

U.S. public diplomacy has also been hampered by the cumbersome State Department bureaucracy that weighs it down unnecessarily and makes it inefficient. This was another result of the 1999 merger of USIA into State. The move was intended to bring public diplomacy closer to policy making, but scattering USIA’s public diplomacy professionals around the Department has not increased public diplomacy input into policy, and it also had the negative effect of undermining cohesion within the public diplomacy profession. Like consular or economic work at embassies, public diplomacy is a specialty best learned on the job over time, not by osmosis.[27]

While USIA had a large and coherent group of professionals who had spent their entire careers developing proficiency in public diplomacy skills, after 1999 the individual public diplomacy officers found themselves mostly buried under layers of bureaucracy with extensive requirements for clearances and red tape. Public diplomacy officers at embassies around the world had been line officers with considerable program and budget authority, able to act quickly and creatively to deal with a changing environment. After 1999 they became staff officers working under centralized embassy administrations and dealing with a puzzling array of offices at the State Department in Washington, instead of one USIA desk officer. The removal of the USIA eliminated a powerful advocate in Washington for individual public affairs officers in the field, who in the past could appeal for support to the USIA Director if necessary; the position of the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy has been an unsatisfactory substitute. Congress and many in the State Department have failed to recognize that public diplomacy and traditional diplomacy have different functions and steps should be taken to strengthen the corps of public diplomacy professionals. [28]
Recommendations

Public diplomacy professionals and other officials ought to engage actively with all Arab media that they have access to.[29] Officials should not hesitate to participate in discussions on media channels because of a perceived hostile bias, nor should they favor “friendly” ones, because they should be willing to discuss and debate anyone. For practical purposes, they should give priority to 24/7 news channels with wide audience reach like al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya. Officials should not avoid discussing sensitive issues like Gaza where strong criticisms of American policy will be expressed because it is the task of public diplomacy professionals to explain what is behind American policy decisions and how the American public sees the issues.

Radio Sawa and al-Hurra television should be substantially reformed in several ways. Their mandate should be clarified along the lines of the VOA charter. High quality talent should be hired to manage programs in a balanced way following the charter. Independent review committees composed of bilingual professional journalists who are familiar with both America and the Arab world should be established to monitor output periodically against the revised mandate, and transcripts should be made freely available. Programming should be designed to appeal to a wide variety of target audiences, presenting serious material with a minimum of entertainment. The primary programming niche for both outlets should be focused on American culture, society, politics and policy, and less on foreign news.

Funding for international broadcasting should be increased to allow important services such as worldwide English and key language services to be maintained even as targeted broadcasting to priority areas like the Middle East continues.

The State Department’s primacy in public diplomacy should be restored, with the Pentagon information function confined to its traditional role in wartime psyops and information for American audiences. Within the Department, most of the officers in the public diplomacy career track should be staffed to public diplomacy departments, not scattered around the organization. And the department should draw on this strengthened cadre of public diplomacy professionals to fill most of the public affairs and public diplomacy positions abroad.


William A. Rugh was a Foreign Service Officer for 31 years, during which he had several USIA assignments in Washington and abroad, and two as U.S. ambassador. He has published books and articles on public diplomacy, and has been teaching graduate courses in public diplomacy at the Fletcher School.

http://www.arabmediasociety.com/?article=709

Transnational Media and Regionalism

By Jon B. Alterman

The Arab League's headquarters in Cairo lie just a few hundred meters away from the city's statue of Simon Bolivar. The two represent monuments to desires for regional autonomy and unity—desires that time has proved easier to conceptualize than to implement.

Yet a half century after the founding of the Arab League and a century and a half after Bolivar's efforts to unite the newly independent states of Latin America, transnational media are doing what statesmen and warriors have been unable to do. Building on common language and common heritage, the people of both regions are beginning to come together in ways that would have seemed wildly utopian only ten years ago.

The challenge will be how the governments of the two regions respond. The rewards for creating durable regional ties are great, and the costs of regional atomization are likely to increase over time.

The parallels between the unification processes in the Middle East and Latin America are striking. In both cases there is a linguistic unity across a wide geographic area, and political borders which divide that area. In both cases, as well, major regional powers do not share in the linguistic continuum, and exclusion from that continuum poses a challenge to them. Finally, in both cases regional broadcasters have emerged in the last decade. Based mainly in London for the Arab market and Miami for the Latin American, these broadcasters have capitalized on advances in technology to create a regional media market where none had existed before.

The creation of a regional media market is notable for several reasons. The first is that it is, in fact, a market. Relying on supply and demand, programming does not simply meet the needs of government broadcasters, but rather actively seeks viewers who enjoy a variety of news and entertainment options. The consequence is an enormous empowerment of the viewership and a dramatic improvement in viewer satisfaction with programming.

The second is that regional markets are, in fact, regional. To a great degree, identical programming can be seen throughout the region. While market-driven programmers direct their broadcasts primarily to groups with high value to advertisers in the Arab world—generally wealthy Gulf Arabs—programming itself affects many throughout the region who may not fit the targeted socioeconomic profile of each station.

Finally, regional broadcasting has created regional news organizations which far surpass—both in terms of covering news and delivering it to recipients—what had existed heretofore. Many of these news organizations are headquartered outside the region, which gives them a degree of independence unprecedented in many countries. The consequence is the emergence of a press corps which is both independent of the agenda of an individual country and one which seeks an audience which transcends national borders.

The potential results of the regional media market described above are not hard to imagine. In his insightful book, Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson makes a persuasive case that two factors controlled the development of national consciousness in state after state in Reformation Europe: commerce and linguistic unity. As printers sought to expand their markets beyond small numbers of Latin-literate elites, they increased their printing in vernacular languages (Luther's Theses drove much of the vernacular printing in Germany for decades). In so doing, they created communities of essentially monolingual people who spoke and wrote in similar languages, but whose communications were largely unintelligible to those from outside the region.(1) These communities drew together to form modern nation-states like Germany, France and Italy.

In the Middle East and Latin America, the advent of print occurred after colonial powers had begun to lay down borders. Napoleon brought movable Arabic type to the region as part of his colonial project in Egypt at the dawn of the nineteenth century, and mass printing remained mainly the province of central governments—ones constructed along the lines of Western states—for most of the next hundred years. As a consequence, Arabic printing tended to reinforce barriers between Arabic speakers rather than elide them. Over the years, strong state institutions arose which tended to reinforce the separation between the nascent states of the region. One of those institutions was the state censor, which helped promote the development of a national identity in much the same way that linguistic unity in Europe led to the perception of national identity.

Transnational media, however, alter this equation fundamentally. What is most apparent about the new technology—print, satellite and internet—is that it facilitates the transmission of information independent of distance. Whereas national difference could be maintained in the twentieth century because geography combined with governmental efforts to create distinct markets for information, information transcends those obstacles to create something much more closely resembling a single market. If the European Union's drift toward unity despite national and linguistic difference is any guide, the political consequences may be dramatic.

There is an additional point about the context which also deserves mention. The technological revolution is beginning to refashion the nature of the nation-state around the world. Concurrently (and only partly as a consequence of technological change), European integration is also beginning to tread on traditional notions of nations and nationalism. Where these changes will lead is unclear. But in a world which increasingly relies on regional groupings rather than national ones, and in which governments increasingly cede initiative to non-state actors, the Arab world and Latin America are unusually well-positioned to facilitate the development of productive relationships which transcend the borders of an individual state.

The opportunities posed by the changes underway are not without their pitfalls, however. States in both regions have traditionally been jealous of power, especially on domestic matters.(2) Non-state actors in both regions—drug lords in Latin America and Islamists in the Arab world—have threatened and to a degree co-opted some regimes, slackening enthusiasm for more laissez-faire state roles. In addition, regional economic development has been uneven, and industrialization in particular has lagged behind other areas of the world. Commodity trading—whether in petroleum or agricultural products—cannot form the basis for long-range economic growth. As markets continue to evolve, benefits will increasingly accrue to traders and marketers: those who create and exploit information. The mere production of a commodity will decline in value, especially as more producers come on line and create a more competitive market for sellers.

In this challenge lies the promise for both regions. Because the people of each region understand their own region well, they have an advantage in information over global competitors. Torpid economic activity in the region, however, decreases the value of that information, as do state barriers which restrict the flows of goods, capital, and the information itself.

Previous enthusiasm about regional unity has always proven to be misplaced. In the Arab world in particular, intraregional trade has remained anemic despite numerous regional organizations and decades of honeyed words about the importance of Arab unity. Despite their rhetoric, states have often dashed the very hopes for regional unity that they have purported to espouse.

Over the last few years, transnational communication has been creating regional markets and regional identities which exceed the dreams of the most optimistic regionalists of the past two centuries. Latin America and the Arab world are uniquely poised to capitalize on the changes underway because of bonds of language and culture which make regionalism fit rather more comfortably than in other regions of the world. What makes for unity among people, however, does not necessarily make for unity among governments. In order to profit from the changes underway, the governments of Latin America and the Arab world will have to redefine their relationships to their people and among themselves, and do so with relative speed. Such a fundamental change in governance is perhaps the greatest challenge of all, and one which too often has been missing from current discussions.


http://www.tbsjournal.com/Archives/Fall98/Articles1/JA1/ja1.html

America's Vanishing Voice?

By Alan L. Heil Jr.

As the fifth anniversary of 9/11 draws near, the Voice of America—the largest US government overseas broadcaster—is on the verge of disappearing as a global network. Only a last-minute rescue by Congress or a Bush administration supplemental can save the long-respected VOA from going silent to millions around the world a few months from now.

The US administration’s budget request for the fiscal year beginning next October calls for:

° Abolition of all VOA broadcasts in English except for highly targeted broadcasts to Africa and Special English transmissions for learners of the language. Yet English is the universal language of choice, used throughout the world in trade, diplomacy, education and on the Internet.

° Cessation of VOA radio transmissions in 11 more languages, including Russian and strategically important Balkans languages. (Ten other mostly European languages had already been cut from VOA’s schedule a year ago.)

° Elimination of the Croatian, Georgian, Greek, Thai and Turkish services.

° Closure of vital AM and shortwave broadcast relay stations in Rhodes and Kavala, Greece.

° Reduction of scores of additional hours of VOA transmission time around the globe. Hundreds of frequency hours already have been cut.

Kenneth Y. Tomlinson, chairman of the US Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) that oversees VOA and the other publicly-funded overseas networks, told The Wall Street Journal: “No one on this board and in this administration is overjoyed about ending any service of the VOA. It was proposed only as a result of having to match up priorities with the budget. Do you want to curtail our satellite television to Iran to subsidize English?”

Subsidize English? This is hardly a subsidy item. Plain and simple, US broadcasting in English is a necessity. More than a billion people around the world use or understand it. Until 2002, English was, rightly, among the highest VOA language priorities. But the Board did what would have been unthinkable during the first six decades of VOA history. It relegated English, except that to Africa, to “second tier” status.

Since 2003, when the VOA was on the air in English around the clock reaching all regions of the world, the Board has abolished English broadcasts in Latin America, Eastern and Western Europe. Today, only four shortwave frequencies remain on the air a couple of hours a day in English to the entire Middle East. The Board also halted VOA’s valuable Rhodes AM transmissions in English to the Levant and did nothing to replace these or relay English broadcasts via FM stations in the region. In 2007, if the latest plan is implemented, VOA standard English will be scaled down worldwide to only five hours a day of heavily tailored Africa-oriented programming.

This would mean death “by a thousand cuts” of America’s global broadcast service in its own language. This, as Al Jazeera and Radio Russia launch around the clock TV services in English, China Radio International in Beijing plans to create a 24/7 English Internet service, and Iran expands its English broadcasts to easily surpass the United States in the volatile Middle East. This, in an era when spreading facts and information over the airwaves is more important to national security than at any time since the Cold War ended.

The Board’s rationale for abolishing English:

1) There are many more sources of English information available to listeners, viewers and Internet readers in today’s world and VOA’s audiences in English are small.

2) Shortwave is a medium of the past and VOA English is largely on shortwave, which fewer and fewer people use.

3) The struggle against terrorism requires huge new investments in broadcasts to the Arab countries, Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan and reprogramming of resources from other parts of the world.

Contrary to the Board’s assertions, the worldwide audience to VOA English is now 13.4 million adults each week, still the most listened-to service at the Voice. Before the reductions were first imposed three years ago, VOA English had a weekly worldwide audience estimated at 16 million. Not surprisingly, as the airtime has been reduced in stages, so has the number of listeners. As one veteran observer and current staff member at VOA ruefully puts it: “I guess if listeners need news of America or the world, they can tune in any time to the 24-hour-a-day English service of China Radio International.” In the words of another: “We’re going down… down… down… a once proud network that achieved a lot over the last sixty-four years.”

Advocates of restoring a healthy VOA worldwide English service say that it is essential in the post 9/11 world to provide, around the clock, honest, comprehensive news and analysis from an American perspective in today’s babble of sound bites and commercially driven formats. This is especially the case when you consider the likely content of the new or planned English services beamed from Moscow, Beijing, Tehran and Doha, as well as the established programs of the BBC World Service and China Radio International.

Because they focus on in-country events in the target regions, the US surrogate networks (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, the Martis to Cuba) are no substitute for VOA News Now in English. The latter offers a full range of news and features about America as well as world and regional news of interest to those tuning in. News Now scripts are transmitted electronically in its headquarters building in Washington, DC to VOA’s forty-three language services. Cut English off FM, AM and shortwave or hollow out the Voice’s central news service, and you cut off a vital information source to the entire network.

To date, more than $200 million has been invested in two new around-the-clock Arabic services created by the Board:

1) Radio Sawa, a youth-oriented entertainment radio service whose producers pride themselves in providing a mix of seventy five percent pop music, and twenty five percent headlines. When Radio Sawa replaced the respected VOA Arabic Service four years ago, the Palestinian intafada and Israeli scorched earth retaliation were at their peak. Arab listeners suddenly heard US overseas broadcasts that featured Britney Spears, Jennifer Lopez and Amr Diab—to the exclusion of the latest crisis news in their own region, save a few fast-paced headlines punctuated by electronic stings and brief field reports.

2) Alhurra TV, launched two years ago with more news and analysis than Sawa but struggling to compete in a field of more than 170 Arabic satellite TV stations. In a recent survey of five Arab countries by Zogby International and the University of Maryland, Alhurra was named as a prime source of news by only one percent of more than 5,000 respondents. It has had mixed reviews and has registered as barely a blip on the media scene, according to analyses and spot checks by the US embassies in Cairo and Baghdad.

In the wake of 9/11, the Board has had unprecedented success in obtaining more money for all of American government-funded overseas broadcasting. But, as in every budget since 2002, its request for the fiscal year beginning next October, it continues to invest heavily in the new privatized Middle East outlets while dismantling core newsgathering and transmissions at VOA, the nation’s only official global network. Indeed, if the current Bush administration request is approved by Congress, the United States will have invested close to $300 million in Radio Sawa and Alhurra TV, despite growing doubts about their overall impact.

The planned reductions in VOA English in four of five continents and the closure of five more Voice language services would have these additional unintended consequences:

° The two million people in China who tune in to VOA English each week (special and standard English) will no longer be able to hear the latter broadcasts—now on the air ten hours a day. They will be denied an in-depth English language window on America, the world, and reports about events in their own country ignored or whitewashed by PRC media. (Three hours daily of Special English to China will remain.) VOA and Radio Free Asia programs in Mandarin, Cantonese and Tibetan are heavily jammed, as are their websites. Among all US publicly-funded radio programs, only VOA English shortwave reaches China in the clear. At least 200 million people are studying English in the PRC, more than two-thirds the population of the United States.

° Those who advocate silencing English by cutting VOA shortwave and medium wave frequencies ignore some basic facts about overseas broadcasting. One is that the same programs beamed via shortwave are often downlinked via satellite to affiliated FM and AM outlets. VOA English has 58 such partner stations, according to the Board’s own research website, in 48 countries from the Philippines to Guyana. Other language services send programs to hundreds of stations, including national and local stations in the Balkan languages destined to cease radio broadcasts: Albanian, Bosnian, Croatian, Greek, Macedonian, and Serbian. Unless next year’s budget reductions are reversed, those programs will no longer be produced. Relays to affiliated stations in the Balkans will cease just as the US backed Kosovo negotiations reach a critical phase.

° Shortwave is essential to any long-range international broadcasting strategy. To quote a leading American authority on international broadcasting, Kim Andrew Elliott (kimandrewelliott.com), it acts as a “failsafe” in times of crisis. No other broadcast technology can vault borders over such great distances and reach listeners when martial law is declared in a country or when its government cracks down on dissenting voices and opposition media. When crises erupt or local media are censored, listening to shortwave surges.

° Announcements on shortwave have alerted American citizens in times of crisis and possibly saved lives. In the 1980s and early 1990s, VOA transmitted information about staging points for emergency evacuations from Iraq, Kuwait, Pakistan, Lebanon, and Jordan. If, because of budget cuts, VOA’s frequencies are relinquished to others, they won’t be available to the United States when most needed. An indispensable “failsafe” in future crises will be gone. Not all American citizens abroad have access to the Internet and many, including military personnel and Peace Corp volunteers, still depend on shortwave.

° Shortwave audiences, in fact, are those VOA and other international broadcasters most cherish. Many are the influential, usually highly educated elites—government and media leaders and opposition politicians most curious about the world beyond their own countries. Listeners to VOA include the Dalai Lama, the presidents of Afghanistan, Albania, Iraq and Georgia, and not so long ago, Saddam Hussein. Speakers at last November’s Conference on International Broadcasting and Research (CIBAR) in Montreal, Canada, stressed that the aim of truly effective transnational broadcasters is to reach communities of “influentials” within other countries, those whose interactions with their compatriots in daily conversational networks can make a difference, and shape events.

The planned silencing of VOA in languages other than English also raises significant questions about whether or not these cuts reflect US strategic priorities:

° Closure of VOA Turkish and Greek radio and TV. In announcing the cuts on February 6, the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) said the Bush administration’s $671.9 million request for the next fiscal year “will fund technological innovation as well as highly visible programs in support of the war on terror.” Cessation of VOA multimedia broadcasts to NATO’s southeastern flank, where the volatile Balkans touch the Islamic world, would have precisely the opposite effect.

Turkey, a largely Muslim nation of 74 million people, is a critical bridge between the West and the Middle East. In a recent InterMedia Inc. study to determine U.S popularity in 61 countries, Turkey ranked 59th. Its press is sensationalist and anti-American. The most popular film in Turkey’s history, Valley of the Wolves—Iraq is now a box office hit throughout the country. It depicts the fictional avenging by Turkish special forces of an accidental arrest of their comrades in northern Iraq by US troops in 2004. Al Jazeera soon will begin translating its new English TV program into Turkish. Iran broadcasts 28 hours of Turkish weekly compared with 12 hours of radio and a half hour weekly of television by VOA.

Despite this, the number of adult listeners and viewers to VOA Turkish, the only US service in that language, has more than tripled since 2003 and is now estimated at around 2.5 million weekly—an impressive gain in the tough Turkish market. The service had a commitment late last year from a Turkish nationwide network to provide a daily TV news slot in prime evening time to VOA Turkish. That is now on hold, pending a final decision on the fate of the service. And it will not pass unnoticed in Turkey that VOA is retaining a Kurdish Service four hours a day, a segment of it in a dialect spoken in eastern Turkey. The American Embassy in Ankara has reacted predictably. “In view of the increased emphasis the BBG is placing on broadcasting in the Muslim world,” an unclassified Embassy cable said, “it would be a serious mistake to cut the VOA Turkish Service.”

Criticism also has erupted over the planned demise of the Greek Service, whose four-member staff provides satellite-fed daily radio and weekly television programs to major networks in Greece, Cyprus and the Hellenic communities in Canada and Australia. The total listening and viewing audience to VOA Greek, also the only US government funded service in the language, is estimated at close to a million in Greece and Cyprus. Two high circulation Greek dailies, To Vima and Elefterotypia, have predicted that Greek-American organizations such as AHEPA and the Hellenic-American Institute will pressure Congress and the State Department to reconsider elimination of the Greek broadcasts. They have a strong case. There are increasing tensions in Cyprus, where a continuation of both VOA Greek and Turkish transmissions would ensure the US could reach both communities on the island if that becomes necessary. In a letter to US senators and congressmen, Thessaloniki broadcasting magnate George Kodopoulos notes: “VOA Greek programs are of increasing importance today because of aggressive marketing by representatives of other networks not sympathetic to the US who are aiming to penetrate the Greek electronic market.” Among those seeking to fill local airtime to be vacated by VOA is Al Jazeera, which is also planning to version its programs in Turkish.

° The end of Russian radio broadcasts. VOA Russian has been on the air for nearly six decades. Is now really the time to abolish the last three hours of daily radio transmissions? Vladimir Putin is tightening restrictions on the media in Russia, as well as non-governmental organizations promoting human rights. Thomas Melia of Freedom House told a recent RFE/RL briefing in Washington that Moscow is the leader of a coordinated worldwide effort by authoritarian regimes aimed at human rights activists, NGOs and journalists—including accredited correspondents of international radio networks. In the words of RFE/RL’s acting president, Jeff Trimble: “It’s déjà vu.”

If VOA radio to Russia vanishes, it could no longer reach about a half dozen FM and AM stations throughout the country, including several region-wide networks. Its live Russian simulcasts on radio stations in Azerbaijan, Khazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Moldova and Uzbekistan also would disappear. VOA would, however, retain a presence on 47 TV stations in Russia but a midlevel manager at the Voice says: “I’m afraid that relays of foreign broadcasts on TV will be cut off by Putin in the next year or so. Then where will we be? We’ll be gone.”

° Abolition of VOA Georgian. An emboldened Russia continues to challenge the government of Georgia in such Caucasian flashpoints as Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Tensions between Georgia and Russia are escalating. President Bush’s visit to Tibilisi last year signaled US support for President Saakashvili and heralded new American-Georgian military cooperation. The opening soon of a petroleum pipeline from the Caspian Sea that crosses Georgia enhances its strategic value to the West. VOA’s going silent in Georgian is likely to be viewed in Tibilisi as an unfriendly act. Abolition of the VOA Georgian Service’s radio satellite feeds will reduce vital information from the West to an emerging democracy at its hour of greatest need. Seven percent of Georgian university graduates listen to VOA each week.

° Elimination of the Thai Service. According to AsiaMedia, Thailand’s low-level, long running Muslim insurgency in the south is showing signs of new strength and could become the next regional center for extremists. Meanwhile, Thailand is in transition after Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was forced from office by anti-corruption street protests in Bangkok and other cities. The Thai government recently shut down more than a thousand community radio stations, citing interference of their transmissions with aeronautical navigations. The real motive, Thai advocates for media freedom say, was to silence the opposition. The tiny four-member VOA Thai Service continues to place materials via satellite on dozens of Thai radio outlets, with occasional contributions for TV.

Over the years, the Thai government has been very sensitive about efforts to close VOA Thai. Two huge Voice relay stations are located in Thailand, one in Bangkok and the other near the northern city of Udorn. These operate under an agreement that can be cancelled on relatively short notice by either the Thai or US government. The Bangkok station beams a powerful AM signal into Cambodia, Burma and Bangladesh—reaching a large and strategically important southeast Asian audience. The Udorn station is indispensable in reaching southern and central China. Maintaining both relay stations is essential to VOA broadcasting in Asia.

Is there an alternative to the continued downsizing of the Voice of America, to make way for its emerging and strategically important TV, Internet and Muslim world operations? The Bush administration recently proposed a $50 million supplemental enhancement of international broadcasting to provide a 24/7 Persian television service in Iran. A close examination of the BBG’s budgets for the fiscal years 2005 through 2007 indicates what it would take to:

• restore a 24/7 VOA English service to the levels of three years ago (nearly worldwide) and

• retain the radio and TV services slated for abolition next year.

That would cost around $24.7 million, roughly four percent of the entire US international broadcasting budget this coming year. It would be about what the Pentagon spends on average every half hour, not including supplementals. One aide on Capitol Hill calls this “small change” in the scheme of things. A $24.7 million VOA supplemental rescue fund could be initiated by an administration persuaded that America’s loss of much of its voice on the world’s airwaves is unacceptable. Or, it could be met through an act of patriotism on the part of Congress, similar to or as part of recent supplementals on Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. It would signal that the United States is serious about using soft power in the global, as well as regional, struggle against terrorism and violations of human rights—not just in the Muslim world, but everywhere.

A recent dispatch of Inside Radio, a Washington newsletter, said of the projected 2007 cuts at the Voice of America: “We’ve seen increasing pressure on VOA budgets, but this seems draconian.” Christian Science Monitor columnist John Hughes, former director of the Voice of America, wrote: “In these challenging times, America’s voice to the world should be strengthened, not weakened.”

And syndicated columnist Georgie Anne Geyer says: “By expanding service to Iran (the administration’s new bogeyman), and increasing Middle East television news coverage on Alhurra, a TV network run separately from the VOA, and Radio Sawa, the United States is unnaturally tying itself closer to only one part of the world—and ignoring the rest … It’s not a done deal yet, and Congress could change it—if, of course, anybody’s paying attention there.”

US armed forces have demonstrated their ability to win wars nearly anywhere on earth. But consolidating the peace is another matter. In Iraq, Afghanistan and other crisis-prone countries in the future, America needs to disperse the fog of war and deploy what the late VOA News Director Bernard H. Kamenske once called “the cutting edge of facts and information.” A $24.7 million supplemental may stop the hemorrhaging for now. But after that, restoring America’s presence on the world’s airwaves can only be ensured through guaranteed sufficient funding of the Voice’s vital radio programming and transmission base. The nation’s voice to the world, all would agree, must remain healthy and vibrant in the post-9/11 age.

Alan L. Heil Jr. is a former deputy director of VOA and author of Voice of America: A History, Columbia University Press 2003, now in its second printing. The book will be issued in paperback in July 2006.


http://www.tbsjournal.com/Heil.html